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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(h)(1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in using the period of time of the parties' two 
marriages when determining a length of time for the award of alimony in the parties' 
second divorce action. The trial court's adequacy of findings presents a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41,122, 974 P.2d 306; Endrodv v. 
Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in its application of "extenuating 
circumstances" standards consistent with Utah Code Annotated section 30-3-5(7)(h) by 
finding as extenuating circumstances for ordering alimony for a period of time longer 
than the length of the second marriage, a long term marriage including the first marriage, 
wife's need for alimony, and husband's ability to pay alimony. The trial court's 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law, reviewed for correctness, without deference 
to the trial court. Utah Sign, Inc. v. Utah Dept. of Transportation. 896 P.2d 632, 633 
(Utah 1995); Mendez v. State Dept. of Social Services. 813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah App. 
1991). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 16, 2001, this case came before the trial court on remand from the 
Court of Appeals, Kellev v. Kellev, 2000 UT App 236, 9 P.3d 171, for determination of 
the remaining issues of (a) allocating the property acquired by the parties during their 
period of common law marriage in accordance with the approach set forth in Burt v. Burt, 
799 P.2d at 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and (b) the entry of further findings addressing 
whether extenuating circumstances exist to justify an award of alimony beyond the five-
year duration of the common law marriage. The trial court entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law on Remand from the Court of Appeals on July 16, 2002 and 
Judgment on Remand on July 29, 2002 which reallocated property between the parties 
and awarded monthly alimony of $3,000.00 to Sonia Kelley from December, 1998 for a 
period of ten years, or until the remarriage or death of the petitioner, whichever occurs 
first, based on findings of extenuating circumstances. (R. 1833-1846; R. 1847-1848). 
Wayne Kelley filed aNotice of Appeal on August 13, 2002. (R. 1851-1852). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Sonia Kelley and Wayne Kelley were first married on May 24, 1980 and divorced 
pursuant to a stipulated decree of divorce in July 1994. (R. 1834.) They subsequently entered 
into a common law marriage with each other, separated in June 1996, and were divorced 
pursuant to Decree of Divorce entered July 22, 1999. (R. 1670, 1679.) 
2. In the Decree of Divorce terminating the common law marriage, Wayne was 
ordered to pay monthly child support of $2,000.00 and monthly alimony of $3,000.00. These 
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amounts were based on Wayne's historical earnings of $10,000.00 per month and Sonia's gross 
earnings of $1,486.00 per month. (R. 1847.) Alimony was ordered to continue for a period of 
time commencing December 1998 for a period of 16 years, or until such time as Petitioner 
remarried or cohabitated, or upon the death of either party. The court based the length of 
alimony upon the parties' total length of marriage, finding that the marriage existed beginning in 
1980 until 1996. (R. 1684.) 
3. Wayne Kelley appealed the decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals 
issued its ruling in Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, 9 P.3d 171. 
4. Within its written decision the Court of Appeals determined that the parties hereto 
had entered into a common law marriage as of July 1994 that was ended by the Decree of 
Divorce in July 1999. The Court of Appeals then remanded this case with specific instructions to 
the trial court to enter further findings, if any there were, that would support a legal conclusion 
that extenuating circumstances existed to satisfy the requirements of Utah Code Annotated 
section 30-3-5(7)(h). Absent adequate findings, the Court of Appeals ruled that the duration of 
alimony under the current decree would be limited to five years. (Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT 
App236,Tfl5&37,9P.3dl71.) 
5. The Court of Appeals also reversed the trial court's finding of changed 
circumstances that allowed for modification of the first decree from 1994 and held that 
there was no statutory or precedental basis for a finding that remarriage to the former 
spouse was in any way materially different than remarriage to a third party for purposes 
of termination of alimony. (Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, ^9, 9 P.3d 171.) 
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6. On remand, the trial court found that the parties had been married in either a 
solemnized or unsolemnized marriage for a total of 18 years. (R. 1842.) The trial court 
concluded that the extenuating circumstances that existed to justify extending alimony 
beyond the term of the common law marriage included (1) the long duration of the 
parties5 marriage; (2) the standard of living to which the Petitioner and the parties' 
children had become accustomed; (3) the needs of Petitioner and her inability to make 
more than $1,486.00 per month; and (4) Respondent's ability to make substantially more 
than Petitioner. (R. 1845-46.) The trial court then ordered alimony for a period often 
years from 1998 (R. 1848.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred by finding that the parties had been married continually for a 
period of 18 years in both marriages and using that finding to support an alimony award 
of longer than the duration of the second marriage. The trial court's finding of a long-
term marriage was based upon the parties' two separate marriages, the solemnized 
marriage from 1980 through 1994, and the parties' common law marriage from 1994 
through 1999. The trial court found that because the parties were married for a long 
duration by virtue of two marriages, the award of alimony in the second marriage would 
not be limited to the length of the second marriage. The trial court's use of the length of 
the first marriage in conjunction with the length of the second marriage to award alimony 
was in error. 
The trial court's cumulative findings of fact of the length of the parties' marriage, 
the needs of the recipient spouse, the standard of living of the parties, and the payor's 
spouse's ability to pay alimony, are inadequate to support the legal conclusion that 
extenuating circumstances existed to support an award of alimony longer than the length 
of the parties' marriage. The trial court's findings of fact are inadequate to support its 
legal conclusion that an award of alimony for a long duration is justified when the trial 
court failed to make any findings beyond those that it made in the Decree of Divorce of 
the common law marriage. The trial court's failure to make adequate and specific 
findings to support its conclusions of law is error and thus, the award of alimony for 
longer than five years should be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING ALIMONY BASED 
UPON THE TOTAL TIME OF THE PARTIES9 TWO MARRIAGES 
RATHER THAN FIVE YEAR LENGTH OF THE SECOND 
MARRIAGE AS INSTRUCTED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The trial court's legal conclusion that because Sonia and Wayne Kelley were 
married a total of more than eighteen years, from 1980 through July of 1999 there should 
be an award of alimony for longer than the duration of the second marriage was in error. 
The trial court, within its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on remand, 
specifically found that the parties had been married in either a solemnized or 
unsolemnized manner from 1980 through 1999 and determined that because the parties 
had a long term relationship, alimony should be for a period of time longer than the 
length of the second marriage. However, the Court of Appeals had remanded this matter 
to the trial court to "limit the duration of alimony under the current decree to five years". 
Kellev v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, Tf37, 9 P.3d 171. The Court of Appeals reasoned 
that "[b]ecause Sonia entered a new marriage at the time of the first divorce decree was 
entered, the remarriage terminated her right to alimony from the first marriage." Id at 
^36. The Court of Appeals ruled specifically that the duration of the common law 
marriage was limited to five years and instructed the trial court to limit the duration of the 
alimony to five years unless the trial court made adequate findings of extenuating 
circumstances. 
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The trial court's findings are inconsistent with its conclusion that the parties were 
married for a long duration. In the divorce trial on the common law marriage, the trial 
court recognized that the first marriage and divorce was a separate entity from the divorce 
on the common law marriage. The trial court considered all other arguments raised by 
Sonia to set aside the prior divorce and/or to modify the prior divorce decree entered in 
1994. The trial court declined to do so finding that the parties intended the divorce to be 
actual and each had knowledge of what they were doing. Additionally, the trial court 
found that no fraud was perpetrated despite Soma's invitation to make such a finding. 
The trial court was affirmed in so holding by the Court of Appeals. In the trial on 
remand, the trial court continued to recognize the first marriage and divorce as a separate 
entity from the common law marriage when it found that property awarded to Sonia in the 
in the original divorce decree became her separate property during the common law 
marriage. (R. 1835.) Nevertheless, the trial court failed to follow the Court of Appeals' 
directive on remand and used, as a basis for concluding that extenuating circumstances 
existed so as to justify an award of alimony for a period of time longer than the duration 
of the common law marriage, facts that were wholly unsupported by its own findings 
from two trials. 
The trial court's finding that the duration of the marriage included both the 
solemnized marriage plus the common law marriage and conclusion that this fact created 
an extenuating circumstance was an error in law. The trial court's legal conclusion that 
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extenuating circumstances existed to justify an award of alimony for a period longer than 
the duration of the common law marriage was erroneous and should be reversed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S "EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES" 
USED TO JUSTIFY ALIMONY FOR A PERIOD OF TIME 
LONGER THAN THE MARRIAGE ARE INADEQUATE 
On remand, the trial court was directed to enter further findings addressing 
whether extenuating circumstances existed as required by Utah Code Annotated section 
30-3-5(7)(h). This statute provides that, "Alimony may not be ordered for a duration 
longer than the number of years a marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination 
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony 
for a longer period of time." Extenuating circumstances sufficient to extend the alimony 
period beyond the duration of the marriage must be explicitly stated within the trial 
court's findings of fact. Rehn v. Rehn. 1999 UT App 41, ^|14, 363 P.2d 306. 
In its conclusions of law on remand, the court determined that the parties' long 
term marriage, Soma's standard of living, her inability to earn more than $1,486.00 per 
month, and Wayne's ability to make more income than Sonia were extenuating 
circumstances that justified alimony for a longer period of years than the common law 
marriage. The trial court did not make any additional findings regarding any other 
circumstances to justify an award longer than the length of the marriage. In every award 
of alimony, the trial court is required to consider certain factors, including "the financial 
condition of the recipient spouse, the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce 
income, the ability of the payor spouse to provide support, and the length of the 
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marriage." U.C.A. §30-3-5(7)(a)(i-iv) (2001). The trial court also has discretion to make 
a determination of an alimony award because of its advantaged position to assess 
evidence and ascertain facts. Willey v. Willev, 951 P.2d 226 (Utah 1997)(citing Owen v. 
Owen. 579 P.2d 911, 913 (Utah 1978)). "However, the trial court in exercising its 
discretion must make findings of fact explicit in support of its legal conclusions." IcL at 
230 (citing Montova v. Montova. 696 P.2d 1193, 1994 (Utah 1985)). In this case, the 
trial court made specific findings of fact in regard to the award of alimony —length of 
marriage, needs of the recipient spouse, and ability of the payor spouse to pay —then 
concluded that these findings supported a legal conclusion of extenuating circumstances. 
The trial court's findings do not support its legal conclusion of extenuating 
circumstances, they only support its legal conclusion of the underlying award of alimony, 
i.e., alimony is appropriate and the amount, and are consistent, if not identical, to its 
findings in the divorce action prior to remand. The trial court failed to make explicit 
findings of fact to support its legal conclusion of extenuating circumstances, see Rehn at 
Tf30, and specifically failed to make findings as to why the mandate of the remanding 
court should not be followed. 
In the findings on the common law marriage trial, the trial court found that prior to 
the divorce the standard of living was one in which Wayne would give Sonia $7,500.00 
per month to pay bills, that Wayne had a combined income of $18,000.00 per month and 
there was no change in the financial arrangements following the divorce. (R. 1663) In 
the remand findings, the court simply repeated its previous findings that Wayne continued 
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to provide Sonia with $7,500.00 per month to meet family expenses, that her house 
payment was $2,400.00 per month, and that Sonia and the children continued to live in 
the lifestyle to which they had become accustomed. (R. 1842). These findings made by 
the trial court on remand do not explicitly support its conclusion that there are extenuating 
circumstances to justify an award of alimony longer than five years. 
There was no testimony or other evidence of extenuating circumstances upon 
which the trial court could make adequate findings. Out of 151 pages of transcript from 
the remand trial, only four are dedicated to the crucial question of whether extenuating 
circumstances extending the term for the payment of alimony existed. At one point when 
Sonia testified about her employment status, Wayne's attorney Martin Custen asked the 
court about the relevance of her present work status. In response, the court noted, "I'm 
sure it has something to do with her ability and whether there are any extenuating 
circumstances that may apply to the alimony issue." Upon cross-examination, Sonia 
testified she received $5,000.00 per month, she had been found capable of earning 
$1,458.00 per month and Wayne had imputed earnings of $10,000.00 per month. (August 
16, 2001 Bench Trial Transcript, pp. 142-146.) There was no testimony as to any other 
aspect that would constitute an extenuating circumstance. None of this testimony added 
information to support a finding of extenuating circumstances. Upon remand, the trial 
court failed to make adequate additional findings to support extenuating circumstances 
and thus, the award of alimony for a period of time longer than the five-year common law 
marriage was in error and should be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's finding that the cumulative total years of the parties' first and 
second marriages justified an award of alimony for a period longer than the length of the 
second marriage was error. The award of alimony for a period of ten years from 1998 
should be reversed and set at a maximum of five years. 
The trial court's findings of "extenuating circumstances" to justify an award of 
alimony longer than the length of the second marriage were inadequate. The trial court's 
findings were limited to the findings to support the award of alimony and the trial court 
failed to make any specific findings to support its conclusion that extenuating 
circumstances existed. The award of alimony for a period often years from 1998 should 
be reversed and set at a maximum of five years. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J<f_ day of May, 2003 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit 1. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Remand from the Court of 
Appeals. 
James C. Haskins (#1406) 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, PC. 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-0234 
Facsimile: (801)539-5210 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY (DIVISION I) 
STATE OF UTAH 
SONIA KELLEY, 
VS. 
WAYNE KELLEY, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. : 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ON REMAND FROM THE 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Civil No. 944700827 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
This case is before the Court on remand from the Court of Appeals, Kelley v. 
Kelley, 9 P.3d 171 (Utah Ct. App. 2000), wherein the Court of Appeals affirmed this 
Court's decision is certain respects and reversed on others. On remand, the only 
remaining issues are (1) the proper allocation of the properties acquired by the parties 
during the term of their common law marriage; and (2) whether "extenuating 
circumstances" justify an award of alimony to the Petitioner for a period of time longer 
than the five year term of the common law marriage. These issues were tried before 
the Court on August 16, 2001, with James C. Haskins, of Haskins & Associates, P.C., 
t YXx 
JUL 1 8 2002 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
representing the Plaintiff Sonia Kelley and Martin W. Custen representing the 
Respondent, Wayne Kelley. The Court, having considered the evidence submitted at 
the trial of this case as well as the evidence submitted at trial on remand, together with 
the post-trial memoranda of the parties, and having entered its Memorandum Decision 
on April 10, 2002, being fully advised in the premises, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 52 
now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were initially married on May 24, 1980, and two children 
were born as issue of that marriage. The parties were divorced for the first time 
pursuant to a stipulated decree of divorce entered on July 18, 1994. 
2. The original decree of divorce awarded to the petitioner the home of the 
parties, subject to the indebtedness thereon; the furniture and fixtures; and two vehicles 
in her possession. The respondent was awarded any other interest the parties had in 
real estate, including the Alaska property, subject to the indebtedness thereon. The 
respondent was also awarded the vehicle in his possession, certain furniture and 
fixtures, and his stock in DSI International, Inc. ("DSP) together with any interest the 
parties had in that company. 
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3. The original decree awarded the petitioner $1,000.00 per month child 
support, and $1,000.00 per month alimony. The alimony was to be terminated in three 
years, upon remarriage of the petitioner, or by operation of law, whichever occurred 
first. 
4. Following the original decree of divorce, the parties immediately entered 
into a common law marital relationship. They continued to act just as they had before 
the decree was entered. The children were not told of the divorce. The parties filed 
joint income tax returns in 1994, and continued to hold themselves out as a married 
couple. The respondent continued to provide the petitioner with approximately 
$7,500.00 per month to meet family expenses, just as he had done prior to the decree 
being entered. None of the titles to the property awarded in the decree were ever 
changed until the parties began having difficulty in 1996. 
5. During the course of the common law marriage, the petitioner acquired 
no additional property. The real property awarded to the petitioner in the original 
divorce decree was thereafter her separate property. However, during the period of the 
common law marriage, petitioner's home appreciated in value, and the principal due on 
the home was reduced by payments on the mortgage made from monies of the marital 
estate. During the trial on remand, however, the parties stipulated that the respondent 
would waive any claim to that increase in equity in exchange for the petitioner's paying 
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the attorney fees owing to Ms. Louise Knauer that the respondent was previously 
ordered to pay, and the Court approved that stipulation. 
6. While the evidence at the original trial suggested that the DSI stock had 
some value, it was impossible to ascertain that value because of DSI's substantial debt 
structure, and with DSI's purchase of the Mathews Company, its liabilities far exceeded 
its receivables. The settling of the F & D lawsuit, which provided some $1.3 million in 
settlement to DSI, did not substantially change that, inasmuch as DSI invested that 
money in a new venture to develop high-end residential property. Thus, significant debt 
over and above the settlement amount still existed. The only real value that DSI has is 
its good will value, which value is best reflected in the fact that the Elga Company was 
willing to loan $25,000 to the respondent using the respondent's remaining stock in DSI 
as collateral, to enable the respondent to gain release of his passport from the Office of 
Recovery Services, State of Utah. When the respondent defaulted on the loan, the 
stock was defaulted to Elga. The Court finds that the value of DSI's good will at the 
time of the original decree of divorce in 1994 was $25,000.00, which is essentially the 
same value that the good will would have had in 1998, when the stock was defaulted. 
7. In July, 1996, the respondent purchased, in his own name, certain 
property in Park City, Utah, known as the Bear Hollow property. The property was titled 
in respondent's name alone. The respondent obtained a loan of $250,000.00 in his 
name on the Bear Hollow property from Olympus Holdings, Ltd., in 1997. He used the 
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$250,000.00 to begin construction on the Bear Hollow property and to pay various other 
personal expenses. 
8. Olympus Holdings, Ltd. ("Olympus"), was a Washington corporation 
created for the purpose of facilitating a loan to the respondent. The money for the loan 
came from a Mr. Charles Walch and certain unnamed investors in Switzerland. It was a 
high-interest loan carrying approximately 18 percent interest. The respondent, along 
with Mr. Fred Frink, facilitated the organization of Olympus, and both acted as officers 
and directors. Elaine Gerber, a friend of the respondent, also served as an agent for 
Olympus. 
9. Subsequently, the respondent obtained a construction mortgage on the 
Bear Hollow property from On Line Lending in the amount of $500,000.00 in his own 
name. The Olympus loan was subordinated to the On Line loan, so that the On Line 
loan took first position on the Bear Hollow property. 
10. After this time, DSI also invested large sums in the development of the 
Bear Hollow property. DSI filed a lien against the Bear Hollow property and 
subsequently brought an action against the parties herein, Olympus, and others, 
seeking to determine the priority of the numerous claims on the property, DSI 
International, Ind. v. Wayne Kelley, etal., Civil No. 980700264 (3rd Dist Ct. Utah, 
Summit County), and that case remains pending. 
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11. In the Spring, 1999, the Bear Hollow property was sold. From the 
proceeds of sale, the loan to On Line Lending was paid off, and also a check was 
issued to Olympus to pay off its mortgage on the property. That check was issued to 
Elaine Gerber, a friend of the respondent, in the amount of $361,146.00 in April, 1999, 
and sent to her address in Texas, where she was residing with the respondent. She, in 
turn, endorsed the check over to Walch Investments, the company of Mr. Charles 
Walch, who provided some of the money for the initial loan from Olympus on the Bear 
Hollow property. 
12. No portion of the $361,146.00, referred to in paragraph 11, above, was 
property of the respondent, and thus no portion of that amount was a marital asset. 
13. Certain funds from the proceeds of sale of the Bear Hollow property 
remain in escrow and are held by the Court in that proceeding pending a determination 
of the interests of DSI and the other parties to that litigation in the Bear Hollow property. 
14. Whatever interest the petitioner or the respondent may have in the 
proceeds from the sale of the Bear Hollow property is a marital asset of the parties 
herein. 
15. During the course of the common law marriage, respondent purchased 
certain furniture and fixtures for the Bear Hollow property from marital assets. 
16. The furniture purchased by the respondent during the course of the 
common law marriage consisted of the following: 
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Item 
Girls canopy bed 
Girls matching chest 
Girls matching night stand 
Girls matching desk & vanity 
Twin bed 
Twin bed 
Twin bed 
Twin bed 
Twin bed 
King bed 
King bed 
Sofa 
Sofa 
Love Seat 
Easy Chair 
Easy Chair 
Antique Table 
Dining Table 
Chest of Drawers 
Chest of Drawers 
Chest of Drawers 
Chest of Drawers 
Chest of Drawers 
Chest of Drawers 
Purchase 
Price 
$ 900.00 
$ 800.00 
$ 350.00 
$ 600.00 
$ 200.00 
$ 200.00 
$ 200.00 
$ 200.00 
$ 200.00 
$1,000.00 
$1,000.00 
$3,500.00 
$1,200.00 
$1,000.00 
$ 750.00 
$ 750.00 
$5,000.00 
$7,500.00 
$1,000.00 
$1,000.00 
$1,000.00 
$1,000.00 
$1,000.00 
$1,000.00 
Disposition 
1995 Maple Ridge, Bountiful, 
1995 Maple Ridge, Bountiful, 
1995 Maple Ridge, Bountiful, 
1995 Maple Ridge, Bountiful, 
1995 Maple Ridge, Bountiful, 
Lost in move 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Sold with 2325 Bear Hollow 
Sold with 2325 Bear Hollow 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Damaged beyond repair 
UT 
UT 
UT 
UT 
UT 
17. In September, 1995, as a result of his work on the F & D lawsuit for 
DSI, the Board of Directors of DSI gave the respondent a bonus in the range of 
$120,000.00. The respondent elected to take the bonus in the form of a new Mercedes-
Benz 600 SL. The respondent ordered the vehicle for delivery in Europe. 
18. In September, 1996, the respondent went to Germany to pick up the 
vehicle, which was paid for by DSI. The purchase order was made out in respondent's 
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name alone. He brought the car back to the United States and drove it for a period of 
time. In the Summer, 1998, the respondent sold the vehicle to Mr. Fred Frink, a 
business associate, for $95,000.00. The vehicle was titled in the respondent's name in 
Alaska at the time of the sale to Mr. Frink. The respondent signed a bill of sale in his 
own name on the vehicle to Mr. Frink. Mr. Frink paid the respondent $50,000.00 in 
cash, and signed a promissory note dated June 1, 1998, in favor of the respondent 
personally, for $45,000.00. At no time did any paperwork in conjunction with the 
vehicle ever indicate that it belonged to anyone other than the respondent. 
19. The testimony of the respondent with respect to the Mercedes-Benz 
600 SL was not credible. The value of the vehicle, representing a bonus paid to the 
respondent during the course of the common law marriage, was $95,000.00. 
20. In 1996, Ms. Teresa Turner purchased an E-Class Mercedes-Benz 
automobile. The Respondent arranged for the purchase of the vehicle and provided a 
certified check to the dealer for the purchase price of approximately $30,000.00. Of that 
amount, $20,000.00 was provided by Ms. Turner as part of an inheritance she received 
from her aunt. The balance of $10,000.00 was provided by the respondent, but was a 
repayment by the respondent of a loan made to him in the amount of $10,000.00 by Ms. 
Turner at the time she sold her prior vehicle. 
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21. In 1998, the respondent arranged for the purchase of a 1998 
Oldsmobile for Ms. Elaine Gerber, to be picked up in Illinois in her name and with her 
money. 
22. In 1998, the respondent purchased an engagement ring for Ms. Gerber 
for approximately $24,000.00. He paid twenty percent down and agreed to pay the 
balance in one year, with interest. The balance owing on the ring after payment of the 
down payment approximated the value of the ring. 
23. Any interest which the respondent owns in Omega Oil is speculative, at 
best. 
24. The parties herein had been married for a total of fourteen years when 
the original decree of divorce was entered in July, 1994. As part of the original decree, 
the parties stipulated to child support in the amount of $1,000.00 per month, and 
alimony of $1,000.00 per month. The alimony was to terminate in three years, upon the 
petitioners' death or remarriage, or by operation of law, whichever first occurred. At the 
time of the original decree, the petitioner had not worked outside the home since the 
time of her marriage in 1980. She had no income. Her expenses during the course of 
the common law marriage far exceeded the $2,000.00 per month provided in the 
decree. Her house payment alone, without considering any other expenses, was 
$2,400.00 per month. The respondent had been providing her approximately $7,500.00 
per month to meet family expenses. 
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25. The provisions of the 1994 decree were clearly inadequate as 
evidenced by the parties continued actions. They continued to reside together in a 
common law relationship just as though no decree had ever been entered. The 
respondent continued to provide support to petitioner and the children in the amount in 
excess of $7,000.00 per month, just as he had before. The petitioner and the children 
continued in the lifestyle to which they had become accustomed. It was not until after 
the parties began having difficulty in 1996 that things changed. 
26. Subsequently, the Commissioner established temporary support and 
alimony of $6,000.00 per month. At trial, based upon the petitioner's gross income of 
$1,486.00 per month, and respondent's historical income of $10,000.00 per month, and 
in light of the expenses of the parties, the Court set child support at $2,000.00 per 
month and alimony at $3,000.00 per month. 
27. The parties have been married continually, in either a solemnized 
marriage or a common law marriage, from 1980 through July of 1999, more than 
eighteen years. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-16.1 (1969). 
2. Any allocation of the parties property acquired during the term of the 
common law marriage requires a systematic approach wherein the Court categorizes 
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that property as part of the marital estate or as separate property belonging to one or 
the other of the parties. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
3. Each party is presumed to be entitled to his or her own separate property 
and fifty percent of the marital property, absent exceptional circumstances justifying a 
different result. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
4. The DSI stock was the separate property of the respondent and, in any 
event, the value of that stock did not increase during the term of the common law 
marriage. There are no exceptional circumstances justifying any departure from the 
presumption that the value of the DSI stock, as the respondent's separate property, 
should be awarded to the respondent. 
5. The property known as the Bear Hollow property was purchased by the 
respondent during the term of the common law marriage and, to whatever extent either 
party herein owned any interest in the Bear Hollow property (which is presently in 
dispute in the Summit County litigation), the proceeds of sale are a marital asset. There 
are no exceptional circumstances justifying any departure from the presumption that the 
proceeds of the sale of the Bear Hollow property, to whatever extent either party owned 
an interest therein, as a marital asset, should be awarded equally to the parties herein. 
6. No portion of the funds used by Elaine Gerber to pay off the Olympus 
loan was the property of the respondent, and those funds were neither a marital asset 
nor his own separate property, but belonged to a third party. 
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7. The antique table and dining room table identified in Finding of Fact No. 
16 above, were fixtures sold with the Bear Hollow property, and the value of those 
assets is reflected in the sales price of that property. Thus, the parties' interest in those 
assets will be determined by the outcome of the litigation presently pending in Summit 
County, Utah. Whatever interest, if any, the parties may have in the proceeds of the 
sale of the Bear Hollow property should be awarded equally to the parties as set forth in 
Conclusion o f Law No. 4, above. 
8. The other items identified in Finding of Fact No. 16 above, with the 
exception of the first four items listed, are marital assets which normally would be 
distributed equally between the parties. However, exceptional circumstances justify an 
award of these items to the respondent, in light of his obligation to pay the marital debts 
incurred during the course of the common law marriage. As to the first four items listed, 
these were gifts to the respondent's daughter, and those items belong to her and are 
neither marital assets nor the separate assets of either of the parties herein. 
9. As to the Mercedes-Benz 600 SL, the value of that vehicle was a bonus 
paid to the respondent during the course of the common law marriage, and thus the 
value of that vehicle is a marital asset. No exceptional circumstances justify any 
departure from the presumption that, as a marital asset, the value of that asset should 
be divided equally between the parties. 
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10. As to the E-Class Mercedes Benz purchased by Teresa Turner, while 
$10,000.00 of the purchase price was provided by the respondent, those funds 
represent the repayment of a loan to Ms. Turner which is not a marital asset, but 
represent the respondent's separate property. No exceptional circumstances justify any 
departure from the presumption that, as his separate property, those funds should be 
awarded to the respondent. 
11. As to the engagement ring purchased by the respondent for Ms. Elaine 
Gerber, the Court finds that the balance due on the ring, with interest, would 
approximate the value of the ring, and thus the ring has no value as a marital asset. 
12. As to the respondent's interest in Omega Oil, the Court finds that any 
such interest is speculative, at best, but is in any event the separate property of the 
respondent. No exceptional circumstances justify any departure from the presumption 
that, as his separate property, his interest in Omega Oil, whatever it may be, should be 
awarded to the respondent. 
13. Based upon (1) the long duration of the parties' marriage; (2) the 
standard of living to which the petitioner and the parties' children have become 
accustomed (which was encouraged by the respondent); (3) the needs of the petitioner 
and her inability to make more than $1,486.00 per month; and (4) the respondent's 
ability to make substantially more than the petitioner, the Court finds these extenuating 
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circumstances to justify the Court in extending alimony beyond the term of the common 
law marriage. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (Supp. 1999). 
DATED this jfe*^ day of Mdy, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
RODNEY S) PAGE • 
Second Judicial District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
M^JCtsL* Ul. GJ^A_J 
Martin W. Custen 
Attorney for Respondent 
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HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, f.C. 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
357 South 200 East, Suite 30F 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-0234 
Facsimile: (801)539-5210 
FILED J 
JUL 2 9 2002 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COUflT 
JFlLffi 
JUL 15 2002 
SECOND 
DISTRICTCOURT 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY (DIVISION I) 
STATE OF UTAH 
SOMA KELLEY, 
vs. 
WAYNE KELLEY, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. : 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 944700827 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
Remand from the Court of Appeals, it is now hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1 The parties have stipulated that the respondent makes no claim to the 
appreciation on the petitioner's residence during the term of the common law marriage, 
and any and all such appreciation is hereby awarded to the petitioner; 
2, The petitioner is awarded one-half of any interest owned by her or by the 
respondent in the Bear Hollow property; 
JUDGMENT ENTERED 
l6tJ\ 
3. The respondent is awarded all furnishings purchased by him for the Bear 
Hollow property, with the exception of those items gifted to his minor daughter, which 
items belong to her; 
4. The petitioner is awarded judgment in the amount of one-half the value 
of the respondent's Mercedes-Benz 600 SL, in the sum of $47,500.00; 
5. The respondent shall pay alimony to the petitioner at the rate of 
$3,000.00 per month from December, 1998 for a period often years, or until the 
remarriage or death of the petitioner, whichever occurs first; and 
6. Each party shall be responsible for his or her own attorney fees, and shall 
hold the other party harmless therefrom. 
DATED this ^ S ^ d a y of jy^y, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
RODNEY^ PAGE 
Second Judicial District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Martin W. Custen 
Attorney for Respondent 
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understanding? 
MS. KELLEY: Yes, it is, sir. 
THE COURT: Thank you. You may be seated. 
Mr. Kelley, will you please stand. You've heard the 
same representation. Did you understand that? 
MR. KELLEY: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And are you willing to be bound by that 
stipulation? 
MR. KELLEY: Yes, I am. 
THE COURT: You may be seated, then. 
And the Court will accept the stipulation of the 
parties, find that in consideration of Mrs. Kelley's assuming 
any obligation owing to Louis Knauer as a result of attorneys 
fees incurred in this matter, Mr. Kelley has relinquished any 
claim for any increased equity which have accrued in the 
Bountiful home between the years of 1994 and.the time the 
decree was entered in the latest divorce. That will be the 
order of the Court. 
You may proceed. 
MR. HASKINS: Thank you, your Honor. We would call 
Ms. Kelley. 
THE COURT: Ms. Kelley, would you step up, please. 
If you'd raise your right hand and be sworn. 
SONIA K. KELLEY, 
having been first duly sworn, called 
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1 at the instance of the petitioner, testified 
2 upon her oath as follows: 
3 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
4 I BY MR. HASKINS: 
5 Q Sonia, would you state your full name for the record, 
6 please? 
7 A Sonia K. Kelley. 
8 Q And your current address? 
9 A 1995 South Maple Ridge Drive in Bountiful. 
10 Q Sonia, have you purchased any furniture since 1994? 
11 A No, I have not. 
12 Q You are currently unemployed; is that correct? 
13 I A Yes. 
14 I Q For the summer. And you — are you going to be 
15 seeking employment soon? 
16 J A Yes, I will in the fall. I stopped working in June, 
17 and I'll.work again in the fall. 
18 J Q Do you have — 
19 MR. CUSTEN: Your Honor, just relevance of her 
20 present work status. 
21 THE COURT: I'm sure it has something to do with her 
22 ability and whether there are any extenuating circumstances 
23 that may apply to the alimony issue. I'll overrule the 
24 objection for whatever weight it might have. 
25 MR. CUSTEN: Okay. 
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Q (BY MR. HASKINS) Sonia, currently to have any 
ability to pay your attorneys fees? 
A No. 
Q How much were you billed for prosecuting the appeal 
in this particular case? 
MR. CUSTEN: Objection, your Honor. There were no 
fees awarded on appeal. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. HASKINS: Well, I'm not sure that was the case. 
I thought it was remanded for -
THE COURT: It was remanded for this matter, but no 
attorneys fees were awarded. 
MR. HASKINS: Okay. I misread that, then. 
THE COURT: At least as I recall. Now -
MR. CUSTEN: Mr. Kelley was the - he obtained the 
reversal, so — 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. CUSTEN: - I'm pretty sure. 
THE COURT: We'll check that out anyway. 
MR. HASKINS: All right. 
Q (BY MR. HASKINS) In any event, do you have any 
ability to pay your attorneys fees incurred in prosecuting this 
matter? 
A No. 
MR. HASKINS: That's all I have, your Honor. 
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1 THE COURT: Cross-examine? 
2 MR. HASKINS: [Unintelligible] I will submit my 
3 affidavit for the attorneys fees that have been incurred after 
4 we've concluded preparing our response. 
5 THE COURT: Is that your agreement in this matter? 
6 MR. CUSTEN: It is, provided I can submit mine. 
7 We're not asking for a fee award, your Honor, but I always 
8 feel -
9 THE COURT: [Unintelligible] present it. 
10 MR. CUSTEN: Yeah. Just the Court understands I 
11 didn't work for free. 
12 THE COURT: All right. 
13 MR. CUSTEN: I know there's a popular misconception 
14 concerning it. 
15 THE COURT: I don't know who holds it, but -
I 
16 MR. CUSTEN: Yeah. None of my clients hold it. 
17 I CROSS-EXAMINATION 
18 BY MR. CUSTEN: 
19 Q Sonia, you do receive $5,000 a month from Wayne? 
20 A Yes. 
21 | Q And you were — the judge found that you were capable 
22 of earning $1,458 per month gross, correct? 
23 A Yes, yes. 
24 Q And the judge found at the time Wayne — that these 
25 figures were based on imputing earnings to Wayne of $10,000 per 
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1 I month. Is that your recollection? 
2 I A I think so. 
3 I MR. CUSTEN: That's all I have. 
4 I THE COURT: You may step down. 
5 MR. HASKINS: We rest, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Rebuttal? 
7 I MR. CUSTEN: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You don't mean to tell me we're done? 
MS. KELLEY: We're done? 
MR. HASKINS: We're done. 
MR. CUSTEN: Mr. Kelley would really - is it the 
Court's preference that we — I don't know. I know the Court 
for a long time. If you feel closing is helpful, tell us. If 
not — 
THE COURT: Let me indicate it would not be helpful 
at this point. As requested by counsel, I'm going to allow you 
to submit your arguments by written memorandum. And if in fact 
you want to appear and make some oral argument relative to 
those matters, I would be willing to do that. But I don't 
think argument at this point is going to help. 
MR. CUSTEN: And that's fine. Mr. Kelley would like 
to try to make a 5:00 o'clock plane. Is the Court going to put 
a limit on how long the — how lengthy the memoranda — 
THE COURT: I am not. I'll give you limit on when I 
want them back. 
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